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ABSTRACT 
Fikret Adaman and Pat Devine (2001) responded to an article in which I criticized proposals 
by socialists to give markets marginal role (Hodgson, 1998). This present essay continues the 
debate, raises some additional issues and considers some later works by Adaman and Devine. 
A central problem in any economic system is the existence of conflicting plans, and some 
partial use of the market is required to deal with this problem. In particular, the Adaman and 
Devine proposal for participatory planning lacks clear and operational criteria to distinguish 
those cases where (according to them) markets should, and should not, be deployed. Their 
reference to the M-form firm does not help them in this regard. This reply further considers 
the inadequate treatment of tacit knowledge and innovation in that proposal. Their proposal 
also has the serious weakness that it allows little separation of powers and requires all but the 
most trivial of decisions to be submitted to an all-encompassing, unitary system of decision-
making. Legitimate individual or group autonomy is thereby endangered. 
 - 1 - 
The Limits to Participatory Planning: 
A Reply to Adaman and Devine 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
Several years ago, Pat Devine (1988) proposed a model of a socialist economy involving 
democratic participatory planning. This was later developed with Fikret Adaman in several 
joint works (Adaman and Devine, 1996, 1997, 2002). This was a very welcome effort, as 
attempts by socialists to lay out in detail how socialism actually might work in practice – 
including how economic decisions of production and allocation are made – are very rare. 
However, I took the view that the proposals by Adaman and Devine were insufficiently clear 
in operational terms, based on a faulty understanding of the role of tacit knowledge in the 
economy, and would stifle innovation (Hodgson, 1998, 1999). More recently, Adaman and 
Devine (2001) have responded to my arguments. Here I take the opportunity to continue the 
debate. I do not respond to all of their points, but choose those that relate most closely to the 
central issue of the viability of their proposal. 
The first section below raises the general problem of conflicting plans. The second and 
third sections concern the vagueness of the Adaman-Devine criteria for distinguishing 
between ‘market exchange’ and ‘market forces’ and thereby the conditions (according to 
them) under which participatory planning would apply. The fourth section raises the related 
problem of who would have the right to participate in decision-making. The fifth and sixth 
sections revisit the questions of tacit knowledge and innovation respectively. In each case I 
show that their response is inadequate. I conclude that the Adaman-Devine proposals are 




Plans and planning 
Within any socio-economic system, a central problem is the reconciliation of conflicting 
preferences or plans. One solution is to impose a dictatorship, where a leading body decides 
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which plans are to be adopted and overrides the wishes of the dissenters. Another solution is 
to establish some democratic voting system, which after deliberation may still block the plans 
of a minority. A third option is to use a system of commodity exchange and the price 
mechanism. In reality, different structured combinations of all three mechanisms are found in 
many societies. No mechanism is itself without its demerits. Adaman and Devine (2001: 230) 
propose that major decisions should be subjected to a process of participatory and democratic 
planning, and they confine commodity exchange or the market mechanism to ‘the sale and 
purchase of output of existing capacity’. 
Personally I am sympathetic to proposals for a degree of participatory democracy. But we 
must be realistic: is it possible to confine the market to a lesser role, in the manner proposed? 
Any response to this question must take into account one of the advantages of the market, 
alongside its disadvantages. Any democratically planned system has to reconcile key 
differences, before agreement and action are possible. Such conflicts have to be resolved 
before any plan can be formulated in detail. In contrast, in a market system, many piecemeal 
agreements and actions are possible, without concurrence on everything. Negotiation over 
price is often a relatively flexible mechanism by which some conflicts can be ameliorated. 
‘Separate, diverse plans can be reconciled by multiple, bilateral deals of negotiated exchange’ 
(Hodgson, 1998: 408). In this way, and perhaps most importantly, the market to a significant 
degree can allow for multiple centres of decision-making, without the requirement that all 
plans are submitted to a single system of authority. 
However, Adaman and Devine (2001: 231) bypass this crucial argument to characterize my 
position in the following terms: ‘Hodgson seems to conceive of planning as an aggregation 
problem in which pre-existing plans have to be reconciled, either by dictatorial imposition or 
by majority decision.’2 In response, I do not conceive it as such, and their reply misses the 
point. I have never believed that planning (of any sort) is an aggregation process, merely 
rendering consistent such pre-existing plans. It is important that people can be sometimes 
persuaded to change their goals. My argument in the preceding paragraph does not depend on 
whether plans are pre-existing and unchanging, or change during some process of interaction 
or negotiation. What it recognizes is that plans are likely to conflict, whether or not they have 
changed in the past, or are changing, or will change in the future. 
The existence of conflicting plans is an endemic problem, and it would be a dangerous 
mistake to assume that any system of participatory or democratic planning will at some point 
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always remove these conflicts. Adaman and Devine (2002: 350) ‘favour consensual decision-
making’ but ‘if agreement cannot be reached, then decisions would be made through an 
agreed formal voting procedure.’ Thereby the majority can outvote any minority. A danger in 
their proposal is thus that diversity and legitimate autonomy may be undermined. In some 
cases the majority may have the moral basis for its rule. But unqualified majority rule has 
dangers too, both in ethical and innovative terms. 
How can we distinguish between ‘market exchange’ and ‘market forces’? 
However, even if majority rule was generally justifiable, the Adaman-Devine proposal for a 
democratic system of participatory planning is both vague and unworkable, as I shall explain. 
Crucially, their attempt to distinguish between ‘market exchange’ and ‘market forces’ is 
conceptually vague and non-operational in practice. According to Adaman and Devine (2001: 
230): 
A distinction is drawn between market exchange, involving the sale and purchase of 
output of existing capacity, and market forces, which in capitalist economies bring about 
changes in the structure of capacity through atomistic decisions on investment that are 
co-ordinated ex post. Market exchange remains an integral part of our model but market 
forces are replaced by a process of negotiated co-ordination in which the groups 
principally affected co-ordinate decisions on investment and disinvestments ex ante. 
Elsewhere, I criticize this attempted distinction at length (Hodgson, 1998: 413-15; 1999: 43-
45). A key argument is that no economic system is static, and products, processes, tastes and 
knowledge are continuously changing. ‘Accordingly, it would be difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that every decision should be referred to some ‘negotiated coordination body’ 
because to some extent it involved something new’ (Hodgson, 1998: 415). To make the 
Adaman-Devine distinction operational, two things are required: first, a clear set of rules to 
distinguish in practice between ‘market exchange, involving … existing capacity’ and ‘market 
forces’ involving ‘changes in the structure of capacity’; and second, clear proposals as to how 
these rules may be policed in practice, to prevent people illegally resorting to the market in 
the cases when (according to Adaman and Devine) their activities should be subjected to 
‘negotiated co-ordination’ on some democratic committee. 
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Adaman and Devine fail on both these counts, and I shall elaborate on the inadequacy of 
their criteria below. In response to my challenge they propose that similar demarcatory 
criteria are actually in operation within modern capitalism. They point to the ‘multi-divisional 
form of firm organization’. In these firms, according to Adaman and Devine (2001: 231-2): 
the headquarters establishes divisions, receives their profits, monitors their performance 
and decides whether they should be expanded, contracted or closed and whether new 
divisions should be established. Although the divisions may have a decentralized budget 
for minor investment, the headquarters acts as an internal capital market and is 
responsible for major investment and disinvestments. … Thus, the M-firm may be 
thought of as institutionalising the distinction between market exchange and market 
forces. 
Note that Adaman and Devine make explicit neither the clear rules nor the demarcation 
criteria; they simply claim that the distinction has been operationalized in practice within M-
form capitalist corporations. Even if their observation were accurate, it is not adequate. A 
request for detailed criteria is not answered simply by pointing to a domain where such 
criteria are allegedly operationalized. 
In addition, and unfortunately for Adaman and Devine, their empirical claim is inaccurate, 
in at least two respects. First, the M-form firm does not involve a ‘corporate structure in 
which the divisions engage in market exchange’ (Adaman and Devine, 2002: 346 n.). In the 
M-form corporation it is the ‘legal person’ of the corporation (not its divisions) that holds 
property rights and can exchange products on the market. Divisions may transfer goods or 
services internally with the firm and keep their own accounts, but this does not involve the 
transfer of property rights and thus it is not exchange proper. I have made this argument at 
length elsewhere, so the details will not be repeated here (Hodgson, 2002). Adaman and 
Devine follow the regrettable practice of some mainstream economists in obfuscating the 
legal nature of the firm and its property rights, and seeing ‘markets’ in places that – by 
sensible definition – they do not exist. 
Second, the evidence does not suggest that M-form firms have successfully operationalized 
a distinction between strategic and major investment at the centre and tactical and minor 
investment in the divisions. In reality, operationalizing the distinction between the rights of 
corporate divisions and the corporate centre has been a continuous and unresolved source of 
tension within prominent M-form firms. Robert Freeland (1996a, 1996b, 2001) shows that 
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historically there has been a problem of demarcating the powers and responsibilities of the 
divisions and the centre with the M-form firm.
3
 
Focusing on the experience in General Motors (GM) – widely cited as the archetypical M-
form firm – Freeland (1996a: 492) shows that the ‘textbook image of GM’s M-form firm is a 
myth’.4 Contrary to the idea that the corporate headquarters dealt with strategic issues, 
devolving tactical issues to the divisions, GM’s history shows episodes where decentralization 
was introduced, not along the lines suggested by Adaman and Devine, but 
to create divisional consent to corporate policies. During other periods, it reverted to 
administrative centralization in which the general office made both strategic and 
operating decisions. (ibid.) 
Hence the reality of the classic M-form firm points not to a clear-cut distinction between 
central and divisional responsibilities, but to a centralized manipulation of the divisional 
structure. Adaman and Devine rely on what Freeland calls a ‘mythical’ account of the M-form 
firm to sustain a distinction for which there is no evidence of practical operationalization. 
A crucial difference between the M-form firm in reality, on the one hand, and the proposal 
by Adaman and Devine, on the other other, is that the former involves multiple centres of 
power, each implementing its own criteria to separate the powers of the divisions and the 
centre, whereas the latter depends on a single set of (unclear) criteria devised by Adaman and 
Devine themselves. Hence, in the case of the M-form firm, the different sets of demarcation 
criteria are to some extent tested by the performance of the firm itself, and its capacity to 
survive in the market. No such test or corrective exists in the Adaman-Devine proposal. If the 
demarcation criteria place excessive limits on the right to enforce decisions without resort to 
the hierarchy of committees, then there is no obvious power or mechanism to correct any 
bureaucratic excess. This is a serious limitation to the Adaman-Devine proposal and does not 
apply to the M-form firm. 
Some Illustrations 
To show the weaknesses of the Adaman-Devine demarcation criteria, consider the following 
illustrations. In each case I ask Adaman and Devine whether ‘market exchange’ or ‘market 
forces’ are involved. Upon the answer to this question depends whether the decision can be 
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made and enforced autonomously, or would require referral to the hierarchy of participatory 
committees. 
1. A lathe in an engineering works requires replacement. An identical model of lathe is 
unavailable. Instead there is an improved model, which introduces a new electronic 
control mechanism. But in most other respects the old and the new lathes are similar. If 
the old lathe is replaced by the new one, is this merely a case of ‘existing capacity’ or 
does it constitute ‘investment and disinvestment’? 
2. A firm integrated under one management has two plants, in different locations. The 
management propose to remove some activities from one plant and locate them in the 
other. In other respects the output of the firm as a whole is unchanged. Is this a merely 
case of ‘existing capacity’ or does it amount more substantially to changes in ‘the pattern 
of investment, in the structure of productive capacity, … in the geographical distribution 
of economic activity, [or] in the size … of individual production units’ (Devine, 1988: 
23)? Or does it depend on the distance between the two plants, or on whether some 
workers are displaced from one plant to the other, or on the scale of the activities being 
relocated? If so, then by how much? 
3. A couple wish to make internal changes to their home, which they own privately. 
They propose to make a study for one partner, who often brings work home from her 
office. With the agreement of her colleagues, she will work at home for up to two days a 
week, using a newly purchased computer. Do these changes involve ‘investment’ or a 
change ‘in the geographical distribution of economic activity’? 
4. An office worker discovers a way of simplifying and improving a record-keeping 
system, by removing some redundant information and recategorizing some of the items. 
Must this innovation be referred to the relevant committees, or can it be implemented 
simply by agreement with immediate and affected colleagues? Or it does it matter that 
the information concerned is of sensitivity or importance? And who is to know whether 
the removed information is really redundant? 
Adaman and Devine provide inadequate criteria to answer these questions. Yet, to repeat, in 
each case the answer is crucial to determine whether, according to them, agents can act on 
their own (including the option of buying or selling), or must instead refer the proposed 
change to a hierarchy of democratic committees. According to their criteria as they stand, it 
would seem that in all the above cases ‘market forces’ apply, and the proposal will be 
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required for referral to the committees. Consequently, in the absence of sharp criteria, there is 
nothing to stop almost every economic activity being referred to the participatory 
bureaucracy. 
Consider case (1) above. According to the Adaman-Devine criteria, it would have to be 
referred to the committees, because new investment is involved, which otherwise would mean 
the use of ‘market forces’ (in their terms). This would be the case even if the change in the 
lathe amounts to simply the replacement (and slight improvement) of one component. The 
operational vagueness of their criteria means that they can claim to retain a place for market 
exchange but in practice put almost everything outside its reach. The bureaucracy reaches 
almost everywhere, with its legitimacy based on the claim that everyone affected can 
participate; but the extent of its operational terms of reference implies a burden of attendance 
at meetings that few would relish. 
My purpose here is not to defend any arrangements in existing society, but to uphold that 
the Adaman-Devine distinction between ‘market exchange’ and ‘market forces’ is both 
conceptually unclear and lacks sharp, practical, operational rules. Consequently their proposal 
embodies the danger that the committees will claim near-universal authority, and a gargantuan 
participatory bureaucracy will swallow up all economic activity. 
Who participates? 
At this stage I wish to raise another problem. According to Adaman and Devine (2001: 234): 
‘Our general proposal is that, at each level of decision making, those who are affected by the 
decisions participate in making them.’ And again: ‘all those with either a relevant input or a 
legitimate interest in the outcome, i.e. all those who are affected by the activity’ will 
participate (Adaman and Devine, 2002: 345). 
The ominous problem arises as to who is allowed and who is disallowed to participate. If 
the decision were up to every individual, then committees may be overly dominated by 
snoopers, committee-lovers, careerists or busy-bodies. Consider case (3) above. Has any 
neighbour the right to participate in the decision to invest in a home office and home 
computer on the grounds that their user will now park their car on the road outside, for up to 
two additional days a week? Surely not. Yet the neighbour would be genuinely ‘affected’ by 
the decision to stay at home and park the car outside. 
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Consider another example, more remote from the world of industry and employment. Do 
‘right to life’ campaigners have the right to interfere in abortions, on the grounds that their 
strong feelings and beliefs are violated by the killing of a foetus? Here, as elsewhere, 
legislatures place limits on the right of interference, no matter how strongly that others may 
feel that they are affected by such actions. I suggest that here, as elsewhere, the right to 
participate in decision-making should be limited. A woman’s right to choose comes into 
conflict with a universal principle of participation. 
Just as acutely, what of the decision to procreate? Everyone on Earth is affected by the 
alarming growth of the human population in the face of limited material resources. Hence 
does everyone have the right to interfere in every decision to copulate without contraception? 
Of course not. It would be an intolerable intrusion into private intimacy, notwithstanding the 
possible consequence of an additional human being in an overcrowded world. 
Some people object to their neighbours mowing the lawn on Sundays, preferring at least 
one day a week of peace and quiet. Others object to high trees or hedges that block out their 
light. In some of these cases rights of interference may be established, in others not. In any 
case, it would be intolerable of the right of interference were unlimited, to the degree they 
applied to any claim of being affected by the decision. In practice, what happens in existing 
developed societies is that complicated rules concerning rights and responsibilities in all such 
decisions have evolved over time, through a combination of common and statute law. 
I do not suggest that Adaman and Devine should attempt to specify all such rules that 
would operate in their desired socialist society. To respond adequately to such a request 
would involve enormously detailed specifications. Instead they should admit that (a) their 
distinction between ‘market exchange’ and ‘market forces’ does not work in conceptual and 
practical terms, (b) any rule system specifying and demarcating rights and responsibilities 
would require the piecemeal accumulation over time of case law and statutory measures, and 
(c) in the end their proposal for participatory planning cannot effectively and entirely confine 
the market to ‘existing capacity’.  
Tacit knowledge 
Previously I criticized Adaman and Devine for misunderstanding the nature of tacit 
knowledge. In earlier works they repeatedly claimed that ‘tacit knowledge is discovered and 
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articulated and, on the basis of that knowledge, economic decisions are consciously planned 
and coordinated’ (Adaman and Devine, 1996: 531-2) and ‘a process of cooperation and 
negotiation ... would enable tacit knowledge to be articulated’ (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 
75). These statements misunderstand tacit knowledge because, by its nature, it can neither be 
fully discovered nor articulated. In their response to my critique of their conception of tacit 
knowledge they ignore the vital argument that it cannot be articulated. Furthermore, the 
mistaken notion that tacit knowledge can be ‘mobilised and articulated’ is later repeated 
(Adaman and Devine, 2002: 343). 
Adaman and Devine (2001: 230) refer to committees ‘using’ or ‘having available’ tacit 
knowledge and of processes that enable ‘the tacit knowledge of the participating groups to 
inform the decisions made’. In a sense, we all make use of tacit knowledge and these 
statements can be interpreted in an unobjectionable manner. But when we make use of this 
knowledge, it is crucially and by definition neither articulated nor made conscious. Hence 
committees cannot ‘use’ tacit knowledge in the sense of laying it out explicitly for discussion. 
For this reason their statements are ambiguous and potentially misleading. 
The following statement by Adaman and Devine (2001: 234) is also problematic: ‘The 
decision-making bodies would have available to them two sorts of knowledge: explicit, 
‘objective’, frequently quantitative; and implicit, ‘subjective’, tacit, typically qualitative, 
provided by the contributions of the groups taking part in the process.’ This passage confuses 
the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge with two other very different distinctions, 
namely between objective and subjective, and between quantitative and qualitative. Neither of 
the other two distinctions have any close relationship to the distinction between explicit and 
tacit knowledge. Adaman and Devine do not define the terms ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ but 
by most understandings of these terms they do not relate to the explicit-tacit dichotomy. The 
danger here is that Adaman and Devine mistakenly conflate the tacit with the ‘subjective’ or 
‘qualitative’. 
For example, if I say: ‘I believe that there are several beautiful fairies at the bottom of my 
garden’ is this statement ‘subjective’ and ‘qualitative’? Perhaps so. But in any case, the 
statement is certainly not tacit. It is explicit and false. 
Essentially, while conceding the importance of tacit knowledge, Adaman and Devine are 
extremely vague concerning its nature and use. Furthermore, neither do they correct the 
proposal in their preceding statements that tacit knowledge can be ‘articulated’, nor do they 
 - 10 - 
recognize that attempts to fully articulate tacit knowledge would be time-wasting and 
ultimately destructive. As Michael Polanyi (1967: 18-19) put it: ‘an unbridled lucidity can 
destroy our understanding of complex matters … the ideal of eliminating all personal 
elements of knowledge would, in effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge.’ 
Overall, Adaman and Devine fail to appreciate that the importance, inevitability and 
irreducibility of tacit knowledge in any society places severe limits on explicit, deliberative 
planning of any kind. In response to this argument I am accused of ‘irrationalism and 
institutional determinism’ (Adaman and Devine, 2001: 236), without any definition of these 
terms. In response, I do not argue in favour of ‘irrationalism’. Instead I propose that rational 
deliberation has cognitive, informational and practical limits. In this respect I can claim 
support from a wide range of theorists, from Thorstein Veblen to Herbert Simon. 
Furthermore, as Polanyi (1967) argued beautifully in his classic book, rationality itself 
depends on the knowledge that is unavoidably tacit and inexplicit. Following Veblen and 
others, I also argue that institutions are carriers of knowledge. But I strongly reject the view 
that individual aims or activity are entirely determined by institutions.
5
 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
Hodgson (1998) argued that the system proposed by Adaman and Devine would often stifle 
innovations by requiring them to be approved by a network of committees. The essential point 
here is that much successful innovation depends on the intuitions of a minority, which is often 
unable to persuade the majority due to the nature of innovation itself. Most people tend to 
prefer the tested and the familiar. Adaman and Devine (2001, 2002) duck this argument to 
propose instead a unitary system of decision-making in which the majority always rules. 
There is no denying that majorities can sometimes innovate, as Adaman and Devine (2002) 
explore at some length, but they simply ignore the implications of their proposed curtailment 
of innovations that do not obtain majority approval. 
There is a high likelihood of error here. For example, when the first electronic computer 
was developed in Manchester in the 1940s, it was thought by a majority of experts to be so 
powerful that only one model would be required in the whole country. No-one fully 
appreciated the possible uses of the computer beyond a mere calculator, and as a processor of 
vast amounts of non-numeric as well as numeric information. There is no obvious reason why 
a more participatory decision-making system would have had a different opinion at that time. 
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Essentially, many technological and institutional innovations depend on the promotion of a 
minority view that is not widely supported or acknowledged at the outset. 
Hence another advantage of a market system is that, within limits and with its own defects, 
it does offer some scope for inventors or entrepreneurs with new ideas – which are inevitably 
regarded by some as doomed or strange – to seek a market for their innovations and to benefit 
from any success. This has always been an important explanation for the technological 
dynamism of capitalism, and it has frequently been raised in the socialist calculation debate as 
a serious limitation comprehensive central planning. This point remains important, even if 
some innovation is possible within other organizational structures, and may be motivated 
other than by profit. 
The response of Adaman and Devine (2001: 235) to this argument is somewhat surprising 
and symptomatic. They admit that innovation was discussed ‘only briefly’ in Devine (1988) 
and ‘it is only in … more recent work’ that it is developed more fully.6 I ask the reader to 
reflect upon this admission: a major attempt to establish the workings of a planned economy, 
that has attracted some support on the left, admittedly addressed the central topic of 
innovation ‘only briefly’ and more than a decade passed before sufficient attention was by 
admission devoted to this topic. The history of socialism is full of proposals that are high in 
sentiment and morality but low in operational detail. Sadly, despite its rare and commendable 
attempt to consider actual economic mechanisms of decision-making, the Adaman-Devine 
proposal fails to avoid the same criticism. 
According to the Adaman-Devine proposal, innovation cannot be allowed free access to the 
market. Any proposed innovation must be considered by the committees. Adaman and Devine 
(2001: 235) try to deal with the problem of uncertainty of success by decreeing that the 
committees must entertain a multiplicity and ‘variety’ of innovations with a ‘pluralistic set of 
criteria’. After due experimentation and testing the superior and more socially useful 
innovations will be chosen: ‘the criteria and interests involved in selecting across the 
innovations that emerge will determine the outcome of the innovation process.’ 
What they fail to show is how it is ensured that a sufficient variety of innovations will be 
chosen within a ‘single participatory process’ (Adaman and Devine, 2002: 352) with a 
sufficiently ‘pluralistic set of criteria’. Even the history of capitalism is littered with 
inventions that failed, or nearly failed, to get the backing of financiers or sponsors, even when 
many such independent bodies were approached. The requirement of committee approval, 
 - 12 - 
within a unitary rather than a polycentric system of committees, would make the chances 
worse, not better. 
Conclusion 
One of the biggest weaknesses in the Adaman-Devine proposal is that provides little 
separation of powers, except at the periphery of decision-making, and even here any 
autonomy at the periphery is inadequately demarcated and protected. It proposes participation, 
but in its name it requires submission and interference, in regard to all but at best the most 
trivial of economic decisions. 
To this weakness, which has been characteristic of socialism since the inception of that 
term in the 1830s (Hodgson, 1999), their proposal adds another. Instead of autonomy it 
heralds a life of participation on committees. Furthermore, the limits of committee 
interference in decision-making at every level of society are not clearly laid down. The 
proposal that everyone has the right to participate in committees that affect them does not 
solve the problem of practically unlimited committee power. If everyone must spend much of 
his or her time running round from meeting to meeting, then genuine and fruitful participation 
is diminished. 
In practice, the Adaman-Devine proposal would end up as a monstrous apparatus of 
unlimited interference and endless deliberation. Its unitary structure of interlocking 
committees lacks an effective separation and plurality of powers. To rectify these omissions, 
people must have the right to make several important decisions concerning their lives and 
their property themselves, subject to some reasonable laws and constraints. Within broad 
limits, people have the right to autonomy and privacy, and to be protected to a large degree 
from the interference of individuals or committees, even if the latter may claim that they are 
affected by actions within this zone of self-rule. This also means retaining within broad limits 
all legitimate rights to buy and sell property – and retaining a substantial economic role for 
the market. Socialist doctrine has no chance whatsoever of survival unless it fully accepts and 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1
 The problem of maintaining autonomy and diversity is an important theme in Hodgson 
(1999). Adaman and Devine (2001, 2002) and Devine (2002) make no reference to this book. 
2
 The five instances where Adaman and Devine use the phrases ‘Hodgson seems’ to say so-
and-so or ‘Hodgson appears to believe’ are followed neither by an accurate characterization of 
my personal view nor of my written position. But I do not wish to bore the reader with 
excessive details. 
3
 Freeland (1996b) is effective response to Shanley’s (1996) critique of Freeland (1996a). A 
fuller account is in Freeland (2001). 
4
 General Motors was one of the four main studies in Chandler (1962). Chandler’s picture of a 
multidivisional structure, with a strategic centre dealing with long-term planning, while 
devolving more mundane matters to the divisions, was taken up by Williamson (1975). 
Fligstein (1990) and Freeland (1996a, 2001) are both critics of Chandler’s account of the 
multidivisional reality and his explanation of its alleged economic efficiency. 
5
 The limits to rationality and the role of institutions as carriers of knowledge are discussed in 
Hodgson (2004). 
6
 They refer to then unpublished work that appeared later as Adaman and Devine (2002) and 
Devine (2002). 
7
 Note that I am not proposing unlimited or unconstrained markets. Even capitalism prohibits 
the buying and selling of slaves, hard drugs, votes, and so on. Neither are rights of privacy 
and autonomy without limit: and rightly so. 
